On January 28th 1986 the space shuttle Challenger launched and exploded only 73 seconds into flight shocking the world and killing the crew of seven. This disaster left the NASA community and its various engineering teams baffled to explain the disaster and some not surprised; while all wanted answers to questions as to why and how this disaster could have occurred, while some already held the data on what could have been the factors for disaster. 2 Research performed indicates there were a number of communication problems both internally with NASA and their Engineering team at Morton –Thiokol Engineering that lead to the disaster in question, specifically poor communication between NASA and the Engineering firm Morton –Thiokol Engineering, the designer of the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), that was discovered after the accident through analysis of existing and post launch data. More specifically this paper will discuss engineering concerns about O-ring design of the (SRB) brought to the attention of NASA
Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster On 28 January 1986, Space Shuttle Challenger on Mission 51 - L broke apart 73 seconds after the launch and it resulted in the death of all seven crew members on board. The challenger started to break into parts after the failure of right Solid Rocket Booster 's O-ring seal. After that, the external tank was destroyed by the explosive burn of hydrogen and oxygen propellants, and Aerodynamic forces completely broke up the orbiter. On the other hand, the crew compartment and other vehicle components were recovered from the Atlantic Ocean after the extended search and operation. After the disaster, United States President Ronald Reagan appointed a special commission in order to investigate the accident.
There were six other men and women on board the Challenger. At this time, space exploration was at its peak and all of America was following the space program. Throughout the day, most of the televisions in the nation were tuned to the Challenger launch. One minute and twelve seconds into the launch, the space shuttle exploded. Such a traumatic
However, the code does enumerate protections for engineers against other engineers. Even though it describes the profession of engineering as one that benefits humanity, there is still a need to
The 1986 Challenger space shuttle crash was a horrific event. Seven crew members: Michael Smith, Dick Scobee, Judith Resnik, Ronald McNair, Ellison Onizuka, Gregory Jarvis and Christa McAuliffe all lost their lives 73 seconds after liftoff. The Challenger space shuttle crashed due to the failure of the primary O-ring. Basically, the O-ring failed and didn’t seal in time due to low temperatures. The president at the time was Ronald Reagan.
Engineering and ethical lessons can be learned from this experience and failure. The structural engineers must always reexamine the final design under accurate building construction codes if there is a design change. The building code is the first criterion to prevent from potential risks. Also, engineers must uniformly communicate with other engineers and management involved in their project. Ambiguous communication will result in misunderstand of their responsibilities on the project.
On February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia came crashing down from space, killing all seven crew members that were present in the shuttle. The crew was an ethnically diverse group of seven, consisting of, Rick Husband, commander; Michael Anderson, payload commander; David Brown, mission specialist; Kalpana Chawla, mission specialist; Laurel Clark, mission specialist; William McCool, pilot; and Ilan Ramon, payload specialist from the Israeli Space Agency. During the 16 days in space NASA investigated a piece of foam that fell from the shuttle at its initial takeoff, it attached the external tank to the shuttle the foam fell off and struck the left wing of the shuttle. On February 1, 2003, the shuttle made its landing approach to Houston,
It is an undeniable fact there was many violations of Code of Ethics.However, the important one was made at the beginning and many different sections of Code of Ethics had been violated at the first situation.Although the executive claimed that they did not take part in the development of the cheating software and became informed just before the scandal revealed, it was not only the responsibility of workers, managers, engineers but also of executive to avoid the production of cars with cheating software in order to not deceive public and protect the honesty, because they were paid for it.Moreover the responsible ones did also not hold the paramount health of the public , by causing to pollute the air above the allowed limits in order to get more profit , so they did also put the interest of the company in front of the public interest.Furthermore insisting on producing diesel cars may be regarded as an violation since it became obvious that diesel cars cause to more air pollution so the health of the public was risked in this situation.Additionally this behaviour caused to injure the reputation of the profession and the company.Therefore both engineers who took part in modification of software and were aware of it and the other managers and executives either aware or not, were guilty in this situation and violated several sections of the Code of Ethics.In my point of view, I would not prefer to risk the trust of the customers and make a contribution to global warning for
However, the reading about Merriespruit: A mining disaster that happened in 1994. Has changed my mind and made me realize that engineering is challenging, and it comes with a lot of responsibilities at stake. Some of the responsibilities are listed in the Engineering Council of South Africa (ECSA) code of conduct. (Engineering Council of South Africa, 2017). Believe me, I have heard about ECSA and have realized that the university uses it to access our coursework.