others’ actions upon us or our interests, but because as a result of the process of speculative evaluation we conclude that a wrongful act remains unethical no matter who does it or what is the consequence; it is unethical on its face. However, the problem remains as to whether an unrelated thirty party’s action is immoral. Even though we can employ the speculative evaluation process we initially employed repeatedly, ultimately we face an infinite regress. To avoid this regress we must conclude that all stealing of grain by any and all agents is wrong. However, we cannot explain this charge of wrongness any further and are once again reliant on Kant’s Prize Essay explanation that we know the good as a result of a psychological feeling.
Polus believes doing whatever is good for oneself is what matters. He does not understand or really accept this claim that it is better to suffer injustice than to commit injustice because he believes justice is relative. Polus claims that he believes justice depends on the individual person and what is beneficial for oneself. However, Socrates denounces this idea that only good matters this in his scene of brutal murder when Socrates says “and if it seems good to me that one of them must have his head smashed, it shall straightway be smashed” (469d5). Polus denounces this instance, saying it is different.
In today’s society, free thinking seems to be a principle less and less broached upon. The average citizen does very little as far as discovery and development. Instead, we listen to others to know what to believe. Education tells us what is supposedly true and religion lets many know what to believe and how to act.
However, it is argued that there are many flaws to Rawls’ theory of justice, particularly in relation to the “original position” and the basic structure of society as the primary subject of justice. This will be argued in the first half of this essay. Another flaw of Rawls’ arises in relation to his two principles of justice, the second principle in relation to distributive justice and the individual’s right to self-ownership. This will be discussed in the latter half of this essay and reinforced by the works of Robert Nozick. A concise conclusion will then be made in relation to Rawls’ theory of justice and whether it truly revived the social contract
In section 6.2 of “Self-Constitution,” Christine Korsgaard explains Immanuel Kant’s theory of the beginning of human reason. To do this, Kant and Korsgaard use a philosophic interpretation of the biblical account of the fall in Genesis. Although I see that this allegory is compelling in many ways, I hold that it could be improved upon by reintroducing the missing elements from the Genesis narrative. In this paper, I will explain Korsgaard interpretation of Kant’s theory concerning Genesis and the beginnings of human reason. I will then argue that the missing elements of the Genesis account, including Eve’s responses to the commandments of God and the arguments of the serpent, teach Adam and Eve fundamental rules of logical inference.
Copleston in one of his books, A History of Philosophy opines that, it is really difficult for one to totally reject all the old values or binding force of what is customarily called morality. This is because, one who attempts this, may degenerate himself as to destroy himself morally, since the traditional morality has put into cognizance, the values that enhance the dignity of the human person, morally and likewise. Then it becomes questionable, as to why Nietzsche calls the old morality the slave morality, even when he retains some of the values in his master morality.
His choice to “take one’s route analytically from common cognition to the determination of its supreme principle” suggests a causality (Kant 4:392): “common cognition” guides the rational agent to the categorical imperative (the “supreme principle”), which allows the agent the ability to create moral legislation. Yet, Kant’s language here, describing his method of inquiry, is far from supportive of an entirely constructivist view of morality. His movement from “common cognition” to the “determination of its supreme principle” is rhetorical, not philosophical. The possessive pronoun “its” in the phrase “the determination of its supreme principle” suggests that, rather than common cognition being the guiding force of the supreme principle of morality, it is the principle which guides cognition. Hence, the supremacy of this principle over cognition and rationality contradicts the constructivist position that reason is the cause of
Shylock very well knew Antonio’s weak financial conditions and need for money, hence taking undue advantage of the same he frames inhuman conditions in the contract knowing that they would be accepted. This shows the freeness of the consent, also the conditions to this contract were totally irrelevant. It talks about giving away a pound of flesh in case money is not returned; indeed this could lead to death. Such conditions are not only inhumane but also irrelevant as it would not monetarily restore the losing party. Hence this contract is immoral on all
Many great minds in the history of the world tried to find the “birth” of morality; its development and its own place in the world. People provided tons of theories and lots of conjectures and still have not come to exact theory about the origin of moral ideas. However, there are some theories which are close to the truth and are based on Immanuel Kant’s “Categorical Imperative”, Edward Osborn Wilson’s “The Biological Basis of Morality” and on Andres Luco’s work “The Definition of Morality: Threading the Needle”. Their theories differ from each other, however, in some places they share the same position on morality. This paper closely examines their theories from a various perspectives and answers to the question of where the origin of moral
Mill starts third chapter with setting restrictions on the individual flexibility that he has so far proposed. He purports his confidence in self-sufficiency aside from when a man ends up being putting others in risk with their activities; he declares that "nobody imagines that activities ought to be as free as assessments." He conceives that individual freedom is undermined by the absence of attention society gives to singular self-sufficiency. The dominant part regularly observes no motivation behind why everybody shouldn't be content with their choices. He attests that humankind wasn't made to just fit in with each other, for if that were the situation the main expertise that people require would be the craft of impersonation.