The Construction Of Value Realism In Kant's Moral Philosophy

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We have listed textual evidences that imply value realism in Kant’s moral philosophy. However, a number of doubts remain whether Kant endorsed realism or value realism. There have been lots of scholars working on these issues. Kantian value realism, I think most famously Alison Hill’ Kantian value realism, has been widely discussed for different purposes. Alison Hill in the article Kantian value realism, evaluates Korsgaard and Wood’s explanation of the construction of moral and non-moral value as a ‘regress’ argument (Korsgaard, 1996a: 119–124; Wood, 1999: 125–132). Hill begins with the source of non-moral values and terminates with the formula of humanity. Hill explains the value of our ends in the humanity formulation. Hill proposes that the source of value is the agent herself rather than else, which he named the ‘‘conferral model’’ of value, as one possible explanation of non-moral value. Another one may be Korsgaard’s Kantian constructivism that correctness of the CI procedure constructs the action-self: making false promises is morally wrong because a maxim of false promising fails the formula of universal law and the formula of humanity tests. Hill points out the problem of Kantian constructivism. And Korsgarrd criticizes realism for three reasons: 1. Realism cannot explain the correctness of ethical statements. 2. Realism is committed to the existence of moral. 3. Realism cannot explain why we have reason to do with some peculiar duties; it is simply a fact

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