The Dieppe Raid was a failure! The raid was a failure because even though it taught troops many lessons to help them with future raids and battles, it failed and many soldiers lost their lives for nothing but defeat. The Dieppe Raid involved troops making mistakes that could have been prevented, although Canada learned from her mistakes and the learning helped with future battles, Canada didn’t win the raid nor did Canada complete their mission.
The inaction and sloppiness of the US government and its military at the time is what caused the USS Indianapolis to fail and for the nearly 900 men to die at sea. If the ship would have been properly repaired and stocked, along with the men on the ship being properly trained for sea life, all those innocent, brave lives would not have died. The ship sank and failed due to the military 's haste upon needing new recruits and the how utterly unprepared the ship was
The lives of soldiers, Norman Bowker and Curt Lemon, illustrate how the war pressures the human spirit to a standard it can’t resemble. The pressure and responsibilities of lost friends and lost acts of courage heavily weigh Norman Bowker down,
“Men killed, and died, because they were embarrassed not to.” Curt Lemon, Norman Bowker and Tim O’Brien have their own stories about how they were cowards and courageous during the war. These three men knew if they did not do what they did, they would have been cowards. It would have made them feel embarrassed. The first story is about Curt Lemon during a visit with the dentist (O’Brien, 82-84).
The Canadian Corps, a 100,000 strong fighting formation, was ordered to the Passchendaele front, east of Ypres, in mid-October 1917. Horrible Conditions Launched on 31 July 1917, the British offensive in Flanders had aimed to drive the Germans away from the essential Channel Ports and to eliminate U-Boat bases on the coast. But unceasing rain and shellfire reduced the battlefield to a vast bog of bodies, water-filled shell craters, and mud in which the attack ground to a halt. After months of fighting, Passchendaele ridge was still stubbornly held by German troops. Sir Douglas Haig, the commander-in-chief of the British Expeditionary Force, ordered the Canadians to deliver victory.
A True Leader Would you believe that two men, both young, eager, and promising fighters could be so different? Johnny, who was a futuristic character in Robert A. Heinlein’s book Starship Troopers, against his parent’s wishes, joined the MI, Mobile Infantry, at age eighteen because his best friend Carl decided to enlist. The rigor of Boot camp forced Johnny to consider if he doubtlessly desired to be an MI.
If one person can be faulted for the US loss at Kasserine Pass (and he was – he was relieved of command and sent back to the US after this battle) it was MG Fredendall. So far we have seen his vague and peculiar orders, lack of situational awareness of the battlefield, and his penchant for bypassing the chain of command. We can also add to this list his single-mined approach with other officers, both peers and subordinates. He also had a bad practice of disregarding the opinions of subordinates (particularly MG Ward’s), and discounting recommendations by those that had a better appreciation of the terrain or situation.
These men made a choice either go to war or remain shameful and go to jail. “They carried their reputations. They carried the soldier’s greatest fear, which was the fear of blushing. Men killed and died because they were embarrassed not to. It was what had brought them to the war in the first place, nothing positive, no dreams of glory or honor, just to avoid the blush of dishonor” (Obrien
position, however, the strain between the ranks compounded. In his book Company Commander, historian Charles B. MacDonald described his experience as a newly commissioned captain to a combat-experienced regiment during the Battle of the Bulge. Early in the campaign, after his first engagement as the company’s commander, MacDonald recalled, “I wondered what the men of my headquarters group thought of me as a company commander now? Had I been a complete failure?
Returning to the 4th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) to assume command as the brigade commander brings me much joy to be reunited with great Non-Commission Officers and Officers that I have previously served with. Unfortunately, this brigade is no longer the brigade I remember when I commanded a battalion within the 4th ABCT not so long ago. In the last 30 days, I have had the opportunity to observe the ABCT and review a multitude of historical documents to assess the state of the brigade. During my observation, I believe the critical leadership problem in the 4th ABCT’s is the lack of vision for the brigade. Therefore, this critical problem has led to other challenging issues within the brigade.
Arthur Currie was one of the greatest generals in Canada. He led Canada to win Vimy Ridge and he was known for his training, strategies and for telling his soldiers the goal of what they were doing. Arthur Currie trained his soldiers in variety of ways, which lead to his greatness. Currie was in fact devoted to his men. Determined to keep casualties low, he challenged impractical orders from the high command, ensured every attack was meticulously prepared by putting them through rigorous training (Unlikely General, 2001).
Billy Pilgrim’s introduction to the war was grim. Soon after his arrival, the regiment he was supposed to be a chaplain’s assistant for was under attack. Three soldiers from the regiment allowed him to follow them. The three soldiers all had
Colder Than Hell: A Marine Rifle Company at Chosin Reservoir was written and published by Joseph R. Owen in 1996. This book gives us a riveting point-of-view of the early and uncertain days of the Korean War through the eyes of Owen himself, as a platoon leader (PL) in a Marine rifle company. As a PL of a mortar section in Baker-One-Seven-Baker Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment- Owen witnessed his hastily assembled men of a few regulars and reservists (who to mention some that have not gone to boot camp) quickly harden into the superb Baker-One-Seven known today. He makes it known quickly (in the foreword and the preface) that some of the major problems he initially encountered was due to how unprepared his unit was. Owen makes the