Features Of Political Accountability

institutions constrains the rule of law, and raises questions on the propriety, legality, and status of the CCDI and its conduct (Lam 2015, 7).

Political Accountability In terms of political accountability, the five countries present quite similar features. Political accountability follows government hierarchy and reflects the prevailing government structures. This illustrates clearly that ACAs are part of the government structure. Political accountability comprises a clear reporting hierarchy, which is one of the strategies ACAs need to combat venality in government (Heilbrunn 2004, 14). Political accountability makes ACAs subject to a democratic system of checks and balances. It is important for the integrity, public acceptance, and support

The accountability and independence of ACAs strengthen each other. Forms of accountability like citizen oversight, submission of performance reports to a higher executive and legislative bodies, external oversight committees, civil societies, and public access to information on the work and activities of ACAs increase their transparency and counters the possibility of abuse of power (Stone 2015, 157-158; OECD 2008, 26-27; Meagher 2005, 94, 101). Here, public accountability of ACAs is discussed in terms of public interaction, public support, and public oversight—some common ways to increase public trust and credibility, and provide legitimacy for

The CCDI is only responsible to the CCP leaders. The political system in China and the structure of the CCP and the process of the CCP’s anti-corruption policy implementation makes accountability almost impossible even within the CCP. As a result, institutions like the media, NGOs, public interest groups and other capable agencies of restraint have no influence and control over ACAs in China because there is no institutional mechanism for a citizens’ oversight function. Moreover, local officials of the CCP have devised ways of side tracking or sabotaging state anti-corruption policies, making the implementation of anti-corruption policies at the local level a matter of formality (Gong 2015, 688; Chueng 2007, 63-64). This makes it impossible for Chinese ACAs to be held accountable for their activities, which negatively affects the public perception of them and reduces their