The Mayguez Organizational Theory

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Applying selected concepts of organizational theory to the Mayaguez incident of 1975 leads to a more comprehensive understanding of events and more accurate lessons learned. Application of organizational theory demonstrates the decision processes at the executive level left the military operation vulnerable to failure. Henry Mintzberg structural contingency model and Lee Bowman and Terrence Deal organizational theory are used and are applied to executive behind focusing on the executive level is twofold: First, it is where final critical decisions were made, and second, military operations cannot take place without an executive authorization. The Mayaguez crisis was rife with potential pitfalls and, though President Ford was equipped…show more content…
INTRODUCTION On 12 May 1975, an American merchant ship, SS Mayaguez, was seized by the Cambodian government in what President Gerald Ford believed was a threatening show of force by the relatively new Khmer Rouge government. The United States government responded swiftly by sending a full military package to rescue the Mayaguez and her crew. In the end, President Ford publicly declared the operation a success, but for the military, it was an abysmal failure. A full report was produced to summarize the events. After reviewing the report, Congress requested, and the Government Accounting Office (GAO) conducted, an investigation to clarify incongruous statements and events listed in the incident report. This thesis is based on the hypothesis that by applying selected concepts of organizational theory to the Mayaguez incident of 1975, one can gain a more comprehensive understanding of events and more accurate lessons learned. Specifically, application of organizational theory to the Mayaguez incident demonstrates that the decision processes at the executive level left the military operation vulnerable to failure. To conduct this analysis, the authors used Henry…show more content…
PURPOSE: The purpose of this thesis is to reexamine the events and published lessons learned of 12 1 no single, cohesive organizational theory per se, the task of examining organizations becomes complicated, requiring integration of a web of different theories and approaches. However, by combining select theories within a larger frame of reference model, a clearer picture of the organization, actors, and its effectiveness is obtained. Applying organizational theory to the Mayaguez incident demonstrates that decision processes at the executive level made the military operation vulnerable to failure. Although the Government Accounting Office (GAO) published a full report of the Mayaguez incident, it was both incomplete and inaccurate in terms of analysis. The report merely consolidated information from various sources within the government, to include the military, rather than applying analysis to the events themselves. Unfortunately for the military, the GAO report was, and still is, the only source of information for lessons learned. Since inaccurate or incomplete, the lessons derived from the information presented left the military vulnerable to committing the same mistakes

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