The Munich Analogy: The Appeasement Of US Foreign Policy

Ever since France and England at the Munich Conference in 1938 followed a policy of attempting to appease Adolf Hitler instead of challenging him after his conquest of Czechoslovakia leading to further aggression by Hitler, U.S. foreign policy has consistently veered away from appeasement toward engagement against aggression. The “Munich analogy” or the appeasement of Adolf Hitler and the disastrous results it produced has formed the underpinnings for U.S. military and foreign policy since with limited success in the few instances it has been followed.

The Munich analogy was the rationale for Presidents Kennedy and Johnson for first sending troops to Vietnam to stop communist expansion into weaker countries and then again for escalating U.S. involvement in that region by sending more and more troops and resources in attempting to curtail communism. In the case of Vietnam,

In that case, the results were diametrically opposite to when it was first employed in Vietnam where the Iraqi army was turned back in virtually no time and Kuwait liberated. U.S. casualties were limited and the conflict was a boon to the U.S. economy where it prevented Iraq from controlling a substantial portion of Mideast oil reserves. It also kept in check the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein and helped the U.S. obtain support from several allies in that region and across the world.

Although the Munich analogy is generally seen to be a poor strategy because appeasement usually does not work as was the case with World War II, the Vietnam War presents some evidence it is not always the best cause of action. Appeasement in that case would have been the better option where the communist expansion would be limited and many American lives saved. The aggression in that case had no benefits whatsoever and instead resulted in tremendous