§ 34-13-3-5(a) prohibits a lawsuit against a public employee for actions committed while the employee was acting within the scope of employment, for his reasoning to dissent or reverse judgement. The language of that provision is clear and unmistakable, and upon that limitation we are all agreed. “I part company with my colleagues, however, in their conclusion that subsection (a) is limited in application to, practically speaking, only those cases where the complaint uses language parroting the words of the statute.” Put another way, according to the majority, the prohibition against suing public employees applies only when the complaint, on its face, asserts that the allegedly negligent
. . if ministers are without laws, they will become rebellious. Neither of these can be dispensed with” (Chan p. 255). Herein lies the ultimate departure from Confucianism, and the reason Legalists deem such thought unforgiveable.
The Court noted, "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." For example, although the law punished actions, such as flag burning, that might arouse anger in others, it specifically exempted from prosecution actions that were respectful of venerated objects, e.g., burning and burying a worn-out flag. The majority said that the government could not discriminate in this manner based solely upon what message was communicated. Finally, the Court concluded that Texas' interest in preventing breaches of the peace did not support Johnson's conviction because the conduct at issue did not threaten to disturb the peace. Moreover, Texas' interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity did not justify Johnson's criminal conviction for engaging in political
Arguably, however, an outright rejection at the frontier of potential asylum seekers would appear to be in breach of the rules of international refugee law and, in particular, the principle of non-refoulement, provided for in Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention. According to the principle of non-refoulement, States should not expel or return an individual to a country where “his life or freedom would be threatened”. Returning at the border fence people who would have applied for asylum if they had been given the chance to do so, without verifying whether they would have invoked protection against refoulement, is thus
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America grants the right to free speech a status superior than that of the other rights. Specifically the First Amendment disallows Congress from establishing any laws controlling the freedom of speech. American jurisprudence establishes the importance right of free speech, which enables proactive engagement on contemporary challenges by the citizenry ensuring extensive and vigorous public dialogue. Free speech facilitates the resolution of conflicts and optimal decision-making by the citizenry. Free speech, however, is not entirely without restraint; surrounding conditions dictate the reasonableness of any control thereof.
Unless of course, this expression is inciting violent or illegal behaviour, or threatening others, in which case it is directly harmful and should therefore be prohibited. I think J.S. Mill would agree with me on these points as he states “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.” (Mill, J.S.,1978). Joel Feinberg, who also had very influential views on the Freedom of Speech debate, may respond to Mills view and propose that the Harm Principle is not enough: “In some instances, Feinberg suggests, we also need an offense principle that can act as a guide to public censure. The basic idea is that the harm principle sets the bar too high
What may be considered as a societal threat to one state may be included in another, indicating that immigration is a subjective rather than objective threat to societal security that differs between states. The securitization of immigration as a threat to the survival of the national community is problematic, as it labels the foreign migrant as the “other,” ultimately excluding them from society (Huysmans 2000:758). As argued by Huysmans (2000), dissertation that frames immigration as a threat to societal security “reproduces the political myth that a homogeneous national community or western civilization existed in the past and can be re-established today through the exclusion of those migrants who are identified as cultural aliens” (758). The act of securitizing immigration is more threatening than immigration itself, as it regularly results in racism and
If civil society does not exist, then moral virtue cannot exist. If moral virtue cannot exist, then everything is permissible. Therefore, if civil society does not exist then everything is permissible. Seabury’s argument fundamentally misunderstands natural rights, because it assumes that civil society–associations formed through human interaction, otherwise defined as politics–determines the moral obligations of men. Politics, by its very nature, cannot infer natural and moral rights upon men.