Why Did The Ldp Lose Power In Japan

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Since 1995, Japan’s dominant political party has been the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). However, in August of 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won the election by a landslide and became the dominant political party. That is, until 2012, when the LDP regained dominance once again. Even though the LDP had failed to win majorities before, the 2009 election was big news because not only did it lose majority but it also finished a distant second to the new majority DPJ. The drastic change in dominance in the 2009 election raises questions about why the LDP lost power and why it was able to bounce back three years later? In this paper, I will present the principal issues that caused the Japanese electorate to change its allegiance in the…show more content…
However, for the most part its philosophy is rather vague, but it can be said that it favors a centralized and efficient government who has an important role in the economy. This means that the importance of ideology for the LDP and its backers is minimal, which means that it is mostly based on individual politicians. Of course due to the homogeneity seen in the Japanese society it is obvious that “Partisan identity is weak among Japanese voters. Steven Reed observes that between 40 to 55 percent of voters have no partisan identities. Even the LDP has consistently commanded only 30 percent of voter support.” However, the LDP has demonstrated great success despite this fact. Although there are numerous reasons responsible for the LDP’s ability to maintain control of the Diet. The LDP’s style of governing, Koenkai, ineffective opposition, and economic success are by far the most influential. The LDP views itself as a “management” approach to government in which it promotes the general welfare of the country and keeps the electorate…show more content…
One of the leaders of the government’s crisis management team described 3.11 as “a management crisis of crisis management.” Other critics claimed that his approach was counterproductive because it just added to the problems of “vertical administration by dispersing legal power across headquarters, councils, and working groups, and task forces in a maze of understaffed, competing, and ill- conceived new organizations.” Like I previously stated, the failure of the DPJ to handle 3.11 was due to the tight hold on the bureaucracy’s ability to do their job. At least, that was the narrative that was being created by influential
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