Operation Anaconda Command Structure Al-Qaeda attacked the United States on 11 September 2001, which forced the U.S. into the Global War on Terror, officially named Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Operation Anaconda, commanded by CENTCOM, took place in Afghanistan at the beginning of OEF. Traditionally since 1941, the U.S. military employed the unified command structure when conducting operations. “Unity of command requires the placement of all forces operating in a specific theatre to achieve a distinct objective under a single commander” (Hope, 2008, p. 1). Operation Anaconda did not utilize the unified command structure, and therefore suffered from ineffective leadership, abandonment of doctrinal roles, command confusion, and bad intelligence reports. No Unified Command Structure At the dawn of OEF in 2001, the CENTCOM commander, GEN Tommy Franks, “served as the unified commander of all operations in Afghanistan” (Grossman, 2004). CENTCOM maintained headquarters at McDill AFB in Florida. Subordinate commands operated their headquarters from the Persian Gulf region. Unified at the CENTCOM headquarters, each joint coalition member had a liaison team in Tampa, Florida. From a strategic context, no one commanded the overall mission in Afghanistan (Hope, 2008, p. 9). Ineffective Leadership …show more content…
“The evolving war in Afghanistan compelled CENTCOM to run a complex and growing operation from a long distance” (Kugler, Baranick, & Binnendijk, 2009, p. 8). The CFACC and CAOC headquarters operated from Saudi Arabia, not Afghanistan (Kugler et al, 2009, p. 8). GEN Franks utilized video conferencing to synchronize information flow between the Afghanistan, Gulf, and Florida regions. This led many in the AOR to believe that the Gulf located commands and Florida headquarters did not fully understand the situation on the
On July 30, 2008, a bloody battle involving Coalition forces took place in the mountainous eastern Afghan province of Nuristan. This was the Battle of Wanat and the devastating amount of Coalition casualties began a vigorous investigation by the United States Army. The village of Wanat, defended by Second Platoon, Chosen Company, Second Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team would fall victim to numerous bad decision made by higher command. Although the men of Chosen Company fought hard, they ended up surrounded, vastly outnumbered, and without any Battalion assets. This paper will argue the reasons for the disastrous outcome of the Battle of Wanat; examining the effective company leadership exploiting effective
As a result of this effort, the proposal has been delayed for further review. Additionally, his leadership and guidance provided well trained Intelligence Soldiers for the Defense Resources and Infrastructure Directorate of the Defense Intelligence Agency where they produced numerous actionable intelligence reports and products making a significant positive impact on the War on Terror. Lieutenant Colonel Gurney played a key role as the primary intelligence staff officer for the 310th Expeditionary Sustainment Command, comprised of over five thousand Soldiers serving within the Iraqi Joint Operational Area in support of Operation New Dawn. He expertly lead a team of ten Soldiers and three contractors responsible to provide all daily intelligence briefings and products to include trend analysis of insurgent attacks, collection management, predictive analysis and staff planning for the Commanding General during pre-deployment training, deployment and combat operations.
Analyzing the mission command principles and the commanding officer’s actions will also be discussed. Specifically, as it relates to building a cohesive team through mutual trust, providing a clear commander’s intent, and accepting prudent risk. While the battle of Fort Riviere and the resulting occupation of Haiti occurred over a century ago, it provides us with an example of American foreign policy during this period and bares resemblance to future American military
Starting in mid-January to mid-February, there was interest in assaulting the Shahikot Valley in the Paktia province of Afghanistan by employing U.S. ground combat forces as part as an operation due to intelligence reports suggesting that enemy forces, which included al Qaeda and the Taliban where in the stages of reoccupying the area to regroup its forces after its sustaining defeats during the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom. A debate between intelligence agencies on whether the enemy troops would be on the valley floor or on the hills. Well before the battle, early intelligence estimates, which drew on HUMINT and other sources, claimed that nearly 1,000 al Qaeda and Taliban forces might be present in the Shahikot Valley but then were lowered to about 200 to 300 personnel (Baranick, Binnendijk , Kuglar, 2009). They also concluded that they were mostly living in the valley’s villages, rather than deployed in the surrounding mountains and ridgelines as they thought they would be from the more tactical
General Petraeus and his Leadership Approach to Mosul A Leaders Restoration of a Nation Following the invasion of Coalition Forces into Iraq in March of 2003 the Army’s 101st Airborne Division, commanded by Major General David Petraeus, found itself in the Northern Iraqi city of Mosul (Lundberg, 2008). With the invasion complete and capturing of the capitol city of Baghdad accomplished, Major General Petraeus and staff began confronting the issues and concerns of what lay ahead for the duration of the unit’s deployment (Lundberg, 2008). The development and implementation of Major General David Petraeus’ strategy to bring stability to Mosul, Iraq and surrounding areas following the 2003 invasion provides insight into his leadership approach
The Effective Military Leader Warrant Officer Romero, Philip T. SPC: Captain Dearth, 1st Platoon The book “Black Hearts One Platoons Descent into Madness in Iraq’s Triangle of Death” by Jim Frederick is a true story about multiple leadership failures and six United States Soldiers from 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division who were convicted for their involvement in horrible crimes while deployed to Iraq. The horrific acts including rape as well as murder committed by the soldiers of 1st platoon were a direct result of poor military leadership. Bad leadership will corrupt any military unit.
The CJCS also outlines and writes the National Military Strategy provided to Combatant Commanders as military context and translation of the National Defense
Three helicopter pilots and crews did not even make the initial infiltration into country because of their inability to fly in the dusty environment and mechanical issues. Being short of assaulters the Delta ground force commander canceled the operation and on the exfiltration a EC-130 Cargo plane collided with an RH53 Sea Stallion killing eight servicemen. Having been publicly embarrassed and vowing to never allow such a failure to happen again military planners pushed for a new command structure that made permanent special operations units outside of the normal military chain of command. Thus, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was born on 1987 out of the Desert One failed hostage
In 1972 Morton Halperin lamented the substantially reduced influence of the military given the limited access the Joint Chiefs had to the President and over reliance on the SECDEF. He cited the need to “press upon the Joint Chiefs to transcend service biases and come up with agreed positions based on a unified perspective.” By the early 1980s, there was a growing movement to reform the JCS system, led by the sitting chairman, Gen. David Jones. US military operations in Grenada and Lebanon in 1983 brought the endemic and longstanding operational ineffectiveness driven by service parochialism into relief, and helped drive the impetus for bi-partisan legislative
General Patton, in the Battle of the Bulge exercised the principles of mission command to the fullest and they yielded significantly great results for the Allied forces. General Patton employed each of the principles in different ways in order to ensure that the German surprise attack did not significantly set back the Allied forces in the war. The exercise of mission command allows a commander to conduct military operations and missions through dispersed execution. According to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command, the definition of mission command is “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations”. General Patton exhibited four of the mission command principles extremely well during the Battle of the Bulge.
By definition, “mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations,” according to ADRP 5-0. Mission command is about knowing when to change the task to fit the purpose. This paper is intended to analyze the mission command of one side of the battle, focusing on the commander’s role in the operations process. The Battle of Bunker Hill was the most important battle of the American Revolution because of Colonel Prescott’s superior command and control.
The events that occurred on September, 11, 2001 were among the most catastrophic events in American history. The events of the day were summarized as 19 militants associated with the terror group al-Qaeda hijacked four airplanes and carried out targeted attacks in the United States. Out of the four planes, two of them were flown into the World Trade Center in New York, a third one into the Pentagon in Washington and the fourth one crashing off course into a field. The attacks resulted in the deaths of over 3000 people and the beginning of a soon to come American counter terrorism policy and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Although there are a lot of conspiracy theories around the real motives and players behind the attack,
Additionally the physical separation of SFAT battalions combined with solid performance while assigned to a different Brigade (BDE) established a separate unit identity for the “War Harks” and they distanced themselves from 4th ABCT. Although improper training, organizational construct, and manning and equipment challenges were all contributing factor, I believe the catalyst for 4th ABCT’s culture decline was the deaths of the BDE Commander COL Timmons, the BDE command sergeant major (CSM), and one of the battalion commanders’. The catastrophic loss of the 4th ABCT command team took a tremendous toll on the BDE staff and key leaders, especially the DCO, LTC (P) Tagoli. After this event LTC (P) Tagoli and several members of the staff became resentful of the mission and numb to the actions and needs of their Soldier. When COL Lanks took command he left many of the responsibilities for daily operations with the deputy brigade commander,
Joint Planning for Operation Anaconda SFC Spurlock, Matthew MLC Class 005-18 Joint Planning for Operation Anaconda Since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism, there have been numerous battles. One of the most important battles that shaped future joint planning of operations was Operation Anaconda. The outcome of this operation was ultimately successful, however, the original intent from the commanders were not met due to errors in the joint planning process. Joint planning during Operation Anaconda proved ineffective because of inaccurate intelligence about the terrain and weather, the exemption of Air Force and Navy during the initial planning phase, and false assumptions about the enemy. Intelligence Intelligence Preparation
Returning to the 4th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) to assume command as the brigade commander brings me much joy to be reunited with great Non-Commission Officers and Officers that I have previously served with. Unfortunately, this brigade is no longer the brigade I remember when I commanded a battalion within the 4th ABCT not so long ago. In the last 30 days, I have had the opportunity to observe the ABCT and review a multitude of historical documents to assess the state of the brigade. During my observation, I believe the critical leadership problem in the 4th ABCT’s is the lack of vision for the brigade. Therefore, this critical problem has led to other challenging issues within the brigade.