Scribbles on Scrap: A Mission Command Analysis of the Battle of the Little Bighorn The massacre at the Little Bighorn in 1876 was one of the most recognizable battles in American history. The defeat of the 7th Cavalry Regiment and the slaughter of 268 Soldiers by the Sioux serves as an enduring subject of study for contemporary military professionals. The basic modus operandi for command principles in the times of the Indian Wars loosely mirrors the mission command philosophy of today; however, if we still lay credence to the efficacy of the mission command philosophy, how was it that a conventional force under the direction of a battle proven leader was defeated by an irregular enemy? In the end, Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer’s complacent …show more content…
This village was likely between 6,000-7,000 Native Americans, with up to 2,000 warriors amongst them (Stewart, 2009). When Terry received reports of signs of this large village (albeit with no indication to the size of the force), he gave the order for Custer to pursue the village from the south while Gibbons maneuvered north, in order to interdict the fleeing Native Americans (Neumann, 2001). As a brief synopsis, the execution of the mission command philosophy is guided by the implementation of the six mission command principles: building cohesive teams through mutual trust, creating shared understanding, providing a clear commander’s intent, exercising disciplined initiative, using mission orders, and accepting prudent risk (Department of the Army, 2012). In the example of Custer’s infamous last stand, we will analyze his implementation of the principles of building cohesive teams through mutual trust, creating shared understanding, providing a clear commander’s intent, and accepting prudent …show more content…
The Department of the Army (2012) defines prudent risk as “a deliberate exposure to potential injury or loss when the commander judges the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment as worth the cost” (p. 5). Custer’s deliberate exposure to injury was the decision to bring his force around to what he believed to be the left flank of the Sioux village when he was now fully aware that his force was outnumbered and fighting an enemy which was conducting a spirited defense where before they were expected to flee. Further, it must have come into his mind that his force was only operating at 70% strength from the outset with the removal of Benteen’s battalion (Neuman, 2001). Whatever his mitigations may have been, it is clear that the risk he took turned out to be imprudent, and the risk he accepted led to his battalion being isolated from the rest of his command where it was summarily encircled and annihilated (Collins,
Colonel Slough would continuously use tempo to keep pushing the Confederate forces back without delay. He refused to let the Confederate forces have the time necessary to regroup and reorganize. Colonel Slough would also change from offensive operations to defensive operations and fight the Confederates with a defense in depth. A defense in depth requires an extreme amount of tempo and Colonel Slough would continuously flank the Confederate forces as they would advance through the canyon. Using primary, alternate, supplementary, subsequent positons, the union force were able to attrite the Confederate forces as they gained ground.
Following the United States government blatant disregard for several treaties, Little Crow and his nation went to war in what is known by many as the Sioux Uprising. During the war, Little Crow would urge his warriors to go to kill as many enemies as possible, however Little Crow himself would protect white people he deemed worthy. As Anderson suggests, Little Crow prevented the potential death of Reverend Hinman and his assistant who were serving as missionaries in the Lower Sioux Agency. Also, Little Crow’s head soldier prevented the death of a local shopkeeper who did business with the tribe. Anderson also presents information about Little Crow’s warring life through the explanation of the damage that Native American warriors did to white settlers.
Alexander Ross’ Account of the Fur Trade In the Pacific Northwest Alexander Ross spent much of his adult life working in the Pacific Northwest in the fur trade for both the Pacific Fur Trade Company and later the Northwest Company. Ross played a pivotal role in the establishment of Fort Astoria at the mouth of the Columbia River for the Pacific Company. After the War of 1812 Ross witnessed the collapse of the Pacific Company and began to work for the Northwest Company where he continued to work for the next three decades. Ross’ account of the first three years with the Pacific Fur Company titled Adventures of the First Settlers on the Columbia River offers a no-nonsense, first hand account of the trials and misfortunes of the first settlers
General Gates had underestimated his troops ability to fight until it was too late to back out. The start of the battle involved
McClellan’s final opportunity to secure a victory over Lee came at a moment of miscommunication within the confederate forces that resulted in a hole in their front lines, providing McClellan a perfect opportunity to push into the confederate forces and push them back. But once again his “trademark cautiousness denied the North several decisive victories” and he ordered his troops to stand on the defensive and not
However, the conditions of the environment, and great distance from civilized establishments made it extremely difficult for Custer to maintain the same type of military discipline within himself or his troops. This aided in the demoralization and combat ineffectiveness of his unit. While this is not necessarily typical of all units fighting in the Indian Wars, it was noticeably true to be captured by historical accounts of both surviving members of his unit and through personal diaries of those who did not survive Little
“Custer's Last Stand” was a victory for the Indian people, but as a result of their win, they brought a lot of attention to themselves which angered the American people. As a result, the US government treated the Native Americans more hostile, allowing John Gibbons to go and attack the Nez Perce Indians, didn’t follow through with their agreements dealing with land and took land away, and kept expanding westward while continuing to grow America East to West. Directly after new got out that the Indians had not only won the battle, but had slaughtered the American army, John Gibbons rounded up every available man and went after the Nez Perce Indians, whom he thought were the easiest and head of attack. Many innocent woman and children died on
In battles to come, he would even change his uniform to add his own personal flare to it (Custer 2014). This shows how Custer rode the thin line between bravery and stupidity, but in all honesty, those can be defining characteristics of a great general. Towards the end of the war he fought with his men in a cavalry raid (McNamara, n.d.). More and more people began to notice Custer and an artist by the name of Alfred Waud started to draw pictures of Custer and print them (McNamara, n.d.). Waud wrote "Custer charged and charged again here capturing and destroying trains and making many prisoners.”
From 1863-1868, the Navajos, or Diné, found themselves the target of a major campaign by the Union Army and surrounding enemies in the American Southwest, resulting in a program of removal and internment. The Navajos know it as “The Long Walk” a series of devastating acts of violence from multiple factions of various enemies. The perspectives of Navajos regarding the “Long Walk” can grant a new context to the changes occurring in the American Southwest during the American Civil War, where the focus of the Union’s military might fell upon Native Americans instead of Confederate forces. Thus, rather than as a program of Indian removal resulting from the Civil War militarization of the Southwest. Navajos perceived the forces working against them
Instead of listening to the experience of his peer, General Lee allowed complacency to misguide his judgement and he ordered an attack of dubious success. General Edward Porter Alexander, then a colonel in charge giving General Pickett the signal to charge, also recounts his hesitancy towards the questionable orders, stating in his autobiography, “But when I looked at the full development of the enemy’s batteries and knew that his infantry was generally protected from our fire by stone walls… I could not bring myself to give the word” (Alexander 468). Many of the officers in Lee’s army were able to forsee that Pickett’s Charge would be unsuccessful. Consequently, this further places the responsibility of the call on Lee, as he, the General of the Army, was not able to predict what his subordinates were. These concerns were also voiced directly to Lee.
“Of 100 men at Nansemond, Indians kill 50”(Fausz 63). The colonists learned not to mess with the Native Americans after these
The second difference that is clearly evident is the U.S. Calvary underestimated the multiple tribe’s courage to stay and fight. Major Reno’s battalion advanced first heading down the Little Bighorn and came across a natural a ford to cross the river. On this account, the Sioux could not see past the creek, and they believed the soldiers were out of cartridges. The major difference in these two accounts in the Battle of Little Bighorn is that the Sioux Nation did not believe they had committed any crimes by leaving the
In June of 1839, a published letter was written called, “The Cherokee War” and in this letter was a description of how John Ridge was killed. The letter states, “About forty half and full blooded Cherokee Indians came to the house of John Ridge... they took him out of bed from beside his wife, carried him into the yard, and there butchered him in a most savage, brutal manner, by stabbing him in the body some twenty-seven times.” John Ridge was not the only one who had a death led from other Cherokee Indians, eight other principal men as well as John’s father were also killed. This letter provides information that the causes leading up to the deaths of these men were from the old Cherokee nation opposing the “Ridge Treaty.”
While Cluster was walking along the little bighorn river the Terry/Gibbon column was marching toward the mouth of the little bighorn. Custer planned a surprise attack but he get spotted before he was able to do it. So he decided to attack without anymore waiting. His scouts warned him that the village is very big but he didn 't hear on them. And so he ran into his crushing defeat.
The plan seemed to be a simple one that required the three units to converge on the Lakota Indians and deal them a definite defeat. Custer and his Seventh Calvary arrived ahead of Gibbon’s unit and little did he know that Crook’s unit was turned back by Crazy Horse and his warriors. Upon Custer’s first initial evaluation, he believed that it was just a small Indian village. Custer split his unit into three divisions and carried out the attack. He was met with thousands of Lakota, Cheyenne, and Arapaho warriors that dealt a devastating defeat to George A. Custer and his Seventh Cavalry.