Alive today, Alvin Plantinga is an American analytical philosopher. Alvin Plantinga argues with the topic the problem with evil, referencing John Mackie’s conclusion who argues against the existence of God with Evil and Omnipotence. Plantinga thinks those who believe like Mackie are mistaken in thinking that the existence of evil is contradictory with the existence of God. Plantinga believes that there is no logical unpredictability between the existence of evil and the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, wholly good God. Plantinga describes sets of propositions may or may not be contradictory and/or to be inconsistent.
Descartes most famous phrase “I think, therefore I am” shows that we cannot be deceived of our own existence as we cannot think if we exist if we do not in fact exist. Descartes’ second part of the hypothesis for the Evil Demon argument refutes the idea of there being such a being with the assumption of a God. With the assumption of a God who is merciful and kind the chance of an evil being deceiving and tricking us would be highly unlikely to happen. Therefore, we can be very sure that we are not being deceived by an evil demon, only for those who believe in God. Other people who do not would rather not believe in the existence of God than believe the uncertainty of everything else (Descartes first mediation, page 202).
Although Bloom states that emotions can’t explain that evolving of morals by their own, he is wrong. Because actually reasoning can’t explain how morals evolve by it’s own. Prinze argues, “reason alone cannot tell us which values adopt, nor can it instill new values.” (“Morality”)
This logical incompatibility between evil and God’s actuality can be made evident in two additional principles provided by Mackie. These are if something is omnipotent, it can do anything and if something is omnibenevolent it will eliminate as much evil as possible. Mackie claims God’s omnipotent characteristic is dependent on him being all powerful. If God is omnipotent than the subjection to limitations, such as the inevitability of evil, should not arise. This first premise is in relation to the second and third because if God is all powerful, wholly good and in existence, the product of his work, our world, should be a reflection of his being.
My perception of my body and matter in general is that it is in its essence divisible (Descartes,1641) This essay here will insert a reference to ‘Leibnitz’s Law’ or otherwise the relatively intuitive principle that for two things to be the same thing, they must share all the qualities of each other. Descartes does not specifically do so, but it is heavily inferred from his argument. Descartes now concludes that since minds are indivisible and bodies are, that according to the Leibnitz’s law they cannot be the same thing and hence:
He believes ‘I think, therefore I am, [is] so certain and so evident that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics [are] not capable of shaking it’. However, there are flaws in his argument. French philosopher Pierre Gassendi objects Descartes quote ‘I think, therefore I am’ by pointing out that Descartes had not yet proven that it was in fact himself who was thinking. Instead be the case that the thoughts he was having could have come from somewhere or someone else, and thus a more accurate thing to say would be ‘there are thoughts’. If we can doubt Descartes ‘I think, therefore I am’ we can also doubt ‘I am, I exist’, and resultantly it means that the following beliefs put forward by Descartes do not have solid ground, meaning the only thing we know to be certain is ‘there are
The first perspective compatibilism, which suggests that the two are aligned and produce untouchable facts, making it seem that the future is open to you. In contrast to compatibilism is incompatibilism, which suggests that free will and determinism are incompatible and that if one component is true, the other must be false. Compatibilist have a reputation to explain their position in a straightforward way, when that very well is not the matter. Van Inwagen argues against the position of a compatibilist because some facts are not untouchable; that is to say that we only sometimes have the ability to act differently. This is a mystery because it is not concrete and is incalculable.
Ernest Nagel, however, maintains that not only are there no good reasons to believe that God exists (he criticizes all of the arguments), there is a good reason to believe that God does not exist. On p. 145, he says raises the difficulty ... " ... which arises from the simultaneous attribution of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence to the Deity. The difficulty is that of reconciling these attributes with the occurrence of evil on the world." We 're going to expand on this idea. We
Rene Descartes argues that since he is capable of being deceived, therefore knows that he is a “thinking thing” (Descartes 65). First, Descartes questions the existence of everything, he begins to doubt if anything is real. After this, he continues by addressing beliefs that rest on his senses, questioning things such as his dreams and how his senses delude him during his sleep. He then continues addressing how the truths of arithmetic and geometry may not be immune to radical doubt. Although the truths of arithmetic and geometry seem so concrete, Descartes continues by supposing that there may exist an “evil genius” who “has employed all his energy to deceive me[him]” (Descartes 65).
Dreier, in his article “Moral Relativism and Moral Nihilism,” examines a similar argument to the one provided by Shafer-Landau, and additionally rests on the internalist premise. Shafer-Landau’s objection to this premise utilizes the amoralist, an individual who makes sincere moral judgments, but is unmoved by them (336-337). He admits that the amoralist is an unusual individual, but still plausible. Dreier is able to evade this counter argument altogether through subscribing to a weaker form of internalism. He proposes the example of an isolated culture of English-speaking individuals with an entirely different vocabulary of moral language (257).
The evil genius could not impose any false ideas on something that did not exist, therefore, he takes his apparent consciousness as evidence for his existence by stating “I think therefore I am” (Meditation 2).