About eight months into his first term as president Bush had to deal with one of the worst tragedies in U.S. history, the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Although many of his moves during this time of turmoil in the United States were viewed as necessary and patriotic, a few years after the attacks information surfaced that completely destroyed Bush’s image. Long before the 9/11 attacks in 2001, during the Clinton administration, intelligence was collected that connected Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin-Laden to
The United States’ planning and execution of the 2002-2007 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) campaign demonstrates how strategic civilian-military relationships can hinder the complexity of war. OIF demonstrates how a failure to understand the strategic environment sets in motion a series of events with potentially irreversible consequences. This paper assesses the strategic U.S. military planning approach to OIF by examining four key areas. First, the paper examines how military commanders and planners
JP1-02 defines an insurgency as “An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict”. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is a modern example of an insurgency. This insurgency arose after the invasion or “liberation” of Iraq by United States and Coalition forces in March of 2003. AQI supports the JP1-02 definition of an insurgency. I will give a background on the rise and decline of AQI. Supporting evidence will be provided from Max Boot’s excerpt
clear, this didn 't happen overnight. When I first became involved with the movement, back in 2006, organizers routinely told me about the days and months prior to the March 19 bombing and invasion of Iraq, when hundreds of thousands of people were mobilized in opposition to Bush and Blair 's criminal war. At the time, I lacked perspective. After all, I was new to activism. Yet, there was plenty of