Non Cooperative Game Theory

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t is every mother’s desire to make their children eat healthy food and not to be picky about it. Is it possible to avoid a conflict between three children about a piece of cake? Is there a possibility of you winning a game of rock-paper-scissors always or maximum number of times? Apart from the applications in economics, the simple and logical Game theory also has solutions for these. So what is game theory? In the broadest terms, game theory analyses how groups of people interact in social and economic situations. There are two main branches of game theory: co-operative and non-co-operative game theory. Most of the research in game theory is in the field of non-co-operative games, which analyses how intelligent (or rational) people interact …show more content…

John Nash extended and generalised the pioneering results achieved by von Neumann and Morgenstern, for which he won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1994. He is best known by the 'Nash Equilibrium', a situation that can be described as the stable outcome resulting from two or more players adopting strategies that they think will maximise their individual gains from a situation or 'game'. The work of von Neumann and Morgenstern led to the application of game theory in economics. The systematic mathematical form of game theory is owed to these two. Many economic situations are situations where players have to act competitively, or bargain, to achieve the best result for themselves. One example is the bidding for spectrum by cellular operators. The auctions are designed using game theory so that the highest bidder gets bandwidth without paying too much (avoiding the 'winner's …show more content…

One of the best known applications of game theory was in the field of political science: the understanding of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) in the event of nuclear war, and the nature of the arms race. In the case of MAD, a game would capture how the best strategy for two nuclear powers with equally effective destructive capacity is to not launch a missile, failing which disaster would ensue for both parties. Therefore, the best strategy for either player is to not launch a missile. The arms race example has the opposite effect. If two countries are faced with the choice of either spending money on welfare or on buying weapons, then both would end up spending on arms, because each would fear that the other will arm itself, and neither would want to be defenseless against the other. As a result, while the socially preferable outcome would be to spend on welfare, the socially inferior outcome (increased arms expenditure) obtains instead. It is more or less like when 2 out of 3 competitive parties (let it be political countries or people) when discussing about certain events in a casual encounter makes the third party feel as if he is the central point of their discussion even if, you know they are talking about one of their pet dog or a certain funny movie which makes him uneasy and in turn even more competitive in nature. So let’s go back to the previous agenda of how to get the children to eat their vegetables? Here’s how it goes: The father of a

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