Arguments Revolving Around This Theory 1. An interesting conversation between Gassendi and Descartes Gassendi: “There is just one point I am not clear about, namely why you did not make a simple and brief statement to the effect that you were regarding your previous knowledge as uncertain so that you could later single out what you found to be true. Why instead did you consider everything as false, which seems more like adopting a new prejudice than relinquishing an old one? This strategy made it necessary for you to convince yourself by imagining a deceiving God or some evil demon who tricks us, whereas it would surely have been sufficient to cite the darkness of the human mind or the weakness of our nature.” Descartes: “Suppose a person had a basket full of apples and, being worried that some of the apples were rotten, wanted to take out the rotten ones to prevent the rot spreading. How would he proceed?
Amongst those, there is the criticism made by constructive empiricist (anti-realist) philosopher Bas van Fraassen. van Fraassen claims there is no need to appeal to a miracle, or to the truth of scientific theories, in order to explain the empirical success of science. He refutes the idea that scientific theories are successful because they have been specially designed to capture the truth, rather, he says empirically successful theories exist because science aims at empirical success. Non-empirically successful theories simply do not survive long. His NMA criticism can be understood through an analogy to the evolution of organisms.
For an example, rather than believing that a person is bad, someone can believe that a person is trusted. Descartes did not truly believe that the information that we receive through our senses is exactly correct. We know that some of our experiences are incorrect only because we are able to know some of them are correct, and for that we have to depend on other. Descartes uses the method of doubt to find true knowledge, but Hume for instance, had different methods what he thought about about how to find true knowledge which Descartes disagreed on. Rene Descartes, believes doubting everything is absolutely way to find true knowledge.
He claims that his doubt is reasonable on the theoretical level, and his radical doubt will not impede him from practical life, since he is only consider the question of epistemology. In other words, his skeptical method does not concern local issues or physical matters in the external world, but only with abstract, general truths, whose validity is not dependent upon “whether they are actually existent or not” (Descartes, trans. Haldane I-7). Indeed, Descartes’ method of doubt is revolutionary in the sense that the uses doubt as a tool to search for a general, firm, and universal principle that serves as the basis of knowledge and an antidote for skepticism. The method he invented — the radical and methodical doubt —is a reproducible model for demarcation between subjective opinions and objective truths.
Mavrodes explains that if god is omnipotent, then the stone question is a contradiction in and of itself. His reasoning makes logical sense because if one agrees that god is an all powerful entity, then there is no realm in which god can create something that he cannot lift. As Mavrodes articulates, the crux of the question is its built in attempt to imply that god is not omnipotent. And, if one believes that God is not omnipotent, then it follows that of course god would not be able to lift the stone, or would not be able to create a stone heavy enough to lift thus rendering him non-omnipotent. And, if one believes that god is omnipotent, then this question is irrelevant because this question is a contradiction.
Other people who do not would rather not believe in the existence of God than believe the uncertainty of everything else (Descartes first mediation, page 202). Overall, the Evil Demon argument is that of a sceptical one. It is based on idea which cannot be proven or likened to, yet it is not unthinkable to be
Opposing this is posteriori knowledge, where knowledge is gathered through observation and experimentation of the senses. When an individual watch someone else get hurt or even experience their own pain, they gain posteriori knowledge of something harmful. When comparing the two types, posteriori knowledge appears to more reliable than priori knowledge. Unlike the priori knowledge with its ambiguous origin, posteriori knowledge is testable through multiple exposure. Plato, however, disagrees.
From this then the imbalance of one side against the other generates a mutual destruction of the opposite side due to the latter’s scanty support. These conditions are the same for any reported event, miracles inclusive. But we shall see that Hume is not justified to judge the truth of all events only by the manner in which it is reported, because we can have a true but badly presented
Firstly, it is formidable since he is able to give the atheist the most charitable assumption that “God exists only in the understanding”, and then go on to show its contradiction and reduce it to absurdity. Furthermore, the defense for Anselm’s argument is a strong one. With the infinity argument, Anselm can solidify his claim that his argument is an exclusive argument for “sui generis” entities. Of course, skeptics would have us agree that two such entities may not prove that all such entities can seamlessly pass Anselm’s argument. However, with the infinity argument, we are one step closer to understanding how Anselm’s argument truly works.
The issue of circularity with the syllogistic view no longer applies because it no longer makes sense: if a point is self-evident there is no room for circularity. If the Cogito is self-evident, then there cannot possibly be circularity. Likewise, if the Cogito is self-evident, then the objection I raised regarding the reliability of logic itself does not hold, as no logic is needed to arrive at something that is self-evident. Therefore the Cogito, if it is self-evident, is sound. As a result, the Cogito as a self-evident fact and intuition successfully defeats the strongest skeptical point that we cannot even know if we exist, and Descartes conclusion of the Cogito
I think, notwithstanding, that an all the more telling feedback can be made by method for the convention issue of shrewdness. Here it can be appeared, not that religious convictions need discerning backing, but rather that they are emphatically unreasonable, that the few sections of the crucial philosophical convention are conflicting with each other, so that the scholar can keep up his position in general just by a significantly more amazing dismissal of reason than in the previous case. He should now be arranged to accept, not simply what can 't be demonstrated, but rather what can be invalidated from different convictions that he additionally holds. The issue of
However, this judgement seems to be more of the commonly biased assumption than something that can be proven. Do we have the same intuition in the reverse scenario? Would we say that someone who has known nothing but abuse since birth wouldn 't be worth rescuing since, because of their lack of positive experiences, didn 't experience any negative experiences either? Is there any reason to believe that this alleged relationship between positive and negative experiences isn 't