Aristotle's Claim Of Happiness

Aristotle filled Nicomachean Ethics cover to cover with claims pertaining to happiness, virtue, friendship, and similar concepts. One claim states that happiness is choice worthy in its own right and self-sufficient, as “it is the end of the things achievable in action” (I.7, 1097b). Another claims finds that happiness requires external goods (I.8, 1099b). The purpose of this paper is to create a complete comprehension of these claims before responding to them.

Comprehending Aristotle’s Happiness Aristotle’s claim begins with the introduction of the complete—or possibly final or perfect—good. As Aristotle notes that each practice and action may have its own immediate good, he finds that the complete good is “for the sake of which the other things are done” (I.7, 1097a). For example, medicine’s immediate good is health, but health is ultimately for one’s happiness; this forms the basis for happiness being choice worthy. The basis for happiness being self-sufficient begins with his definition of self-sufficient: “when all by itself it makes a life choiceworthy and lacking nothing” (I.7, 1097b). The seeming paradox of self-sufficiency while needing external goods and the interpretations of self-sufficiency will be discussed later.

The Three Lives and Happiness To understand Aristotle’s happiness, it is necessary to understand his criticisms

It is not only action or virtue that create a happy life; virtuous action is necessary to create a happy life. “Moreover, in a complete life. For one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one day; nor, similarly, does one day or a short time make us blessed or happy” (I.7, 1098a). Furthermore, virtuous action cannot merely come on occasion but instead must endure throughout