Doolittle Raid Analysis

Introduction

War is not only won by tactical battles but mental battles too. Throughout history it has been shown that an effective psychological victory is just as important if not more important than a victory on the battlefield. The psychological aspect effects opposing sides. One side will earns a moral victory well the other notices its own vulnerability. This can be achieved in many different ways, one of them is by hitting an enemy in a believed secure place, like a capital city. After the tactical movement a further propaganda movement is required for it to become a victory. Psychologically, a direct attack on an enemy’s capital will have devastating effects on public morale. It creates a demoralizing effect and demonstrates susceptibility.

It was much more a symbolic victory then a tactical victory. A great plan needed to have speed and audacity.

History

In order to understate the importance of the Doolittle raid, the mentality of both the Japanese and American must first be understood. Before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Americans weren’t thinking of war especially not in the Pacifica. Many Americans believed that it was not their war and America’s isolation policy would allow the country

“The AAF had several medium bombers capable of launching the attack: the B-18, B-23, B-25 and B-26” (Chun 31). The Aircraft that was chosen was the B-25 Mitchell over the other aircraft because the B-18 had become obsolete and the other two aircraft have larger wingspan then the B-25. The B-25 was a twin engine, medium bomber with a range of 2,000 miles with the capability to carry a normal bomb load of 2,400 lbs (Cohen). It wingspan was also a compact 53 feet long. The aircraft were stripped down off all unessential items to lower their weight and modified to increase their range. To increase its range by 500 miles, a 225-gallon auxiliary fuel tank were added in the bomb bays, a 60-gallon tank was added to replace the bottom turret, and 10 five-gallon fuel cans were to be used in flight (Cohen). The plan was to launch the bombers 500 miles off the east coast of japan and after the attack head another 1,200 miles to selected Chinese bases. A Russian base in Valdivostok was only 600 miles from Tokyo, but was not selected because of the reluctance of Russian to be drawn into the