Yoshida Cold War

Post-World War 2 Japanese defence and arms normalisation

Article 9, the Yoshida Doctrine, and the advent of Cold War

After the Second World War, Japan adopted the 1947 Constitution, also known as the Peace Constitution. Some of its key points included the emperor being “the symbol of the people”, gender equality, human rights, right to suffrage, and the separation of the church an state; but what is said to be the most important directive is Article 9 (Henshall, 2012, pp. 150-151). Article 9 is its most famous concept, “interpreted as legally banning the use of armed force in the defense of national objectives” (Katzenstein, 2007, p. 1). Japan’s military, then, is under the jurisdiction of the civilians. Accordingly, Article 9 acts as a constraint

Because Japan’s hands were tied, Yoshida argued that Japan’s constitution was “inspired by US ideals and the lessons of defeat, renounced arms, and the Japanese people were determined to uphold it”, successfully circumventing USA’s calls for Japanese rearmament (Pyle, 1996, p. 234). However, because Japan was under US protection, it “would have to become a subordinate to the United States in international affairs”, therefore playing to the whims of the US (Pyle, 1996, p. 235). Japan was pressed to participate in maintaining security in the region, particularly in remilitarising and creating a large army; Yoshida was still able to circumvent the pressure by creating the SDF (Jieitai) with only around 150,000 men as opposed to the 300,000 men that the US was asking, and using the Constitution by saying that “Article 9 would not permit the dispatch of these forces overseas” (ibid, p. 236). The SDF’s role would only be “exclusively defensive”, as approved by the Diet, and the defence policy of the country would only be on exclusive defence (senshu boei). Prime Minister Sato also introduced the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, calling for the non-possession, non-production, and non-introduction of nuclear weapons to Japan (Arase, 2007, pp. 564). The Japanese leadership also argued that the Constitution prohibits the creation of military, and would therefore only create a defence force to maintain

Even before China started upgrading their military capability, Sino-Japan relations have already been rocky. However, during the Cold War, the two states grew wary of each other. Japan and South Korea normalised relations with each other, while the former also joined the US in visiting Taiwan and maintaining that “the Taiwan area were also important factors for Japan’s security”; China saw this as evidence of Japanese militarism (Hook et al, 2001, p. 191). At the turn of the century, China saw the need to modernise their military capability, reasoning for “comprehensive security” in the region (Drifte, 2002, p. 41). With the bold militarisation moves China has taken, particularly in the South China Sea disputes, Abe has strengthened its relations once again with the United States and allies in the Southeast Asian region. In May 2015, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the US, and was seen as “a significant reinforcement of the alliance between Washington and Tokyo” (Marcus,