Pearl Harbor Dbq

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However, this conflicted relationship prevented a solidified military strategic vision, with both leaders working against each other to sway the Emperor. By the spring of 1942, Japan had attacked the US bases in Hawaii and in the Philippines, controlled the Dutch Indies, Wake Island, Guam, Thailand, and Burma. The Japanese intended to establish control over the Pacific region and were successful in the execution of their offensive through the late winter of 1942. During the operational pause in early 1942, there were several options the Japanese could have taken to avoid the defeats suffered over the remainder of the war. First, the Japan military should have transitioned to a defensive posture. Second, if the Japanese were to remain on the …show more content…

Admiral Yamamoto’s drive destroy the American carrier capability was so fierce, it dominated the operational planning. The Naval General Staff should have transitioned to a defensive posture to consolidate their gains made thus far in the war. If Japan had reinforced and built up key positions on their new territory, it would require the US to fight much further east against a bunkered in enemy. Clausewitz argued that there were advantages to taking the defense, depending on who had the initiative. Japan’s war aim was to acquire regional control over the Pacific. The US initiative was to stop Japan. Therefore, in this, it was more advantageous for Japan to fortify a stronghold from which to fight and expel US forces. While the US carrier fleet survived the Pearl Harbor attacks and the Air Force developed long rang bombers, if they US needed to commit forces in Southeast Asia, traveling through Japanese controlled expanses, it would arguably stress US logistics and manpower, especially as the US Pacific campaign was woefully under …show more content…

First, the Japanese Navy had suffered damage to the fleet and lost a number of trained personnel. Given the extremely limited military industrial complex of Japan, the Navy needed to take time to repair and rebuild what they could. Second, the Japanese logistic capacity was already limited and stretched thin, even by the winter of 1942. Conquered territory needed to be reinforced and resupplied. For every mile the Navy moved the front, it cost the logistic commands two miles to support the interior lines. Lastly, although this point is nearly impossible to prove, if the Navy had shown a willingness to limit the number of offensive operations, they might have gotten more support from the Japanese Army. General Showa was not against naval operations in the pacific, but constantly worried that they Navy would require too much ground support. If the Navy fortified already taken ground, it might have eased the tension and mistrust between the services and allowed for a more joint operation at the strategic

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