It would seem impossible to respond to the question posed if it cannot even be said that Descartes satisfactorily distinguishes mind and matter as different substances. For the sake of this paper, I will begin with the doubts Descartes’ Meditations arise leading to Descartes’ explanation, or lack thereof, of how mind and matter interact as different substances. I will then continue with a critique of Descartes’ statement(s) as
The first thing that must be discussed in order to answer the question appropriately is: What is truth? This is a really difficult question to answer. There is a big difference between something that is believed to be true and something that is true, basically because if something is believed to be true is not completely certain or accurate, could be one way or another. On the other hand something that is true is certain and definitive and no questions are raised, but there are many types of truth as well. According to Daniel Patrick Moynihan “Everybody is entitled to their own opinion, but they're not entitled to their own facts” which means that everyone can believe in what they want, but their facts must be able to be seen and understood
Forms are transcendent. This means that they do not exist in space and time. Furthermore we cannot experience Forms through our senses, therefore we gain this knowledge through reason. Consequently though we can have knowledge of the Forms, but not knowledge of particular objects of sense experience, the Forms must be separate from particular thing. Plato used Form to overcome his relative problems with knowledge.
Plato describes that knowledge is possible, but is instilled in our reason. He contradicts the view of epistemology and says that our senses and experiences do not provided enough reason to be considered knowledge. Lawhead deplics Plato as being, “a typical rationalist who thought that ultimate knowledge must be objective, unchanging and universal”.(194). When it comes to the second epistemological question, rationalist believe that reason alone is the only way to find true knowledge. Lawhead uses the example of mathematics and logic to describe that we come to conclusions by means of reason.(192).
For speculative reason, the concept of freedom was problematic, but not impossible. That is to say, speculative reason could think of freedom without contradiction, but it could not assure any objective reality to it…Freedom, however, among all the ideas of speculative reason is the only one whose possibility we know a priori. We do not understand it, but we know it as the condition of the moral law which we do know ( KpV3-4). With a completely different strategy in the First Critique where freedom was explicated in order to confirm the possibility of morality, Kant reverses this doctrine by noting that the moral law is the grounding of the possibility of transcendental freedom. Kant reverses the doctrine of the First Critique, i.e., freedom is possible only under the conceivability of acting in accordance with moral law when he writes: For had not the moral law already been distinctly thought in our reason, we would never have been justified in assuming anything like freedom…But if there were no freedom, the moral law would never have been encountered in us ( KpV4
Both intellect and emotion are involved and important to the human soul, creating a crucial contrast which humankind must learn to equally balance. There must be a constant neutrality to balance the two. The age of Enlightenment serves as an intellectual and emotional motivation which humankind benefits, its goal to reach complete intellectual is unreliable and impossible to achieve. To be at a state of complete, perfect reason is unachievable for humans because emotions are an essential aspect of being an existing human. Only is humankind can maintain equilibrium between both intellect and emotion, they; then, have a chance to be generally content in life.
In order for something to be logically valid, its negation must be contradictory. As a consequence, to doubt that one is doubting would be like to think that one is not thinking, and this would lead to a contradiction. Since the action of thinking requires a thinker, Descartes was able to deduce that he must exist. Therefore, this proves the validity of Descartes’ reasoning and makes us come to the part where Descartes’ “Cogito ergo sum” or “I think therefore I am” is brought into being. After applying the aforementioned method, Descartes relies on reasonable doubt as a foundation for true knowledge, keeping in mind that there is one thing that reason forbids him to doubt and that is his own activity, the activity of thinking.
Socrates creates a thought-provoking claim around the idea that ‘beauty’ and ‘beautiful things’ are fundamentally different, however, Hippias displays a failure to appreciate this distinctiveness and continues to dispute that there is no difference in the matter. The basic question Socrates asks is ‘What is beauty?’, and Hippias addresses the essence, not by defining the feature, but by giving an example of it. Socrates repeatedly receives an example of a ‘beautiful thing’. The Socratic Quest for the definition of the essence is resulting without conclusion, not only in the discussion between Socrates and Hippias but in a number of Plato’s dialogues. Without a concluding answer, the audience is left questioning the metaphysical status that beauty
From one perspective, our experience of ourselves is the most certain thing as Descartes himself would concur. Nonetheless, on the off chance that we can't define an unmistakable argument to go past this perspective, we are left with what is called solipsism, or the thought that we can just really have knowledge about our own mental states. Descartes himself attempted to base his knowledge of the outside world on the Cogito – his assurance he could call his own existence – and the way that more dependable knowledge is by all accounts clear and distinct. Notwithstanding, as we found in our dialog of the Meditations, both the thought of clear and distinct thoughts and the cogito itself were hazardous. As specified prior, Descartes was a scholar who wanted to think in solitude.
On the other hand, Cratylus argues that names cannot be arbitrarily chosen in the way that conventionalism asserts or advocates because specific names belong naturally to specific things. Names, then, are correct insofar as they reveal something about the nature of what is named when vocalised. With the two arguments presented, Socrates joins the conversation, taking on the responsibility of defending basal principles of naturalism with