Tooze does conclude that Hitler he probably wished to avoid a big war with Britain and France until the early 1940’s, but this become impossible with the events that had unfolded by early 1939. He further argues that Hitler’s anti-Semitic views and his belief in the Jewish responsibility of Germany’s combined with Western democracies aligning with each other propelled Hitler to take action that would lead to the Second
General Clinton’s inaction after General Washington’s force departure guaranteed the historical unfolding of the Siege of Yorktown. The largest contributor to this British disaster lay in the lacking of an analytical apparatus, which could have effectively processed and utilized British intelligence. General Clinton chose to focus more on salvation in the form of reinforcements from Britain than on the immediate steps he could implement in his intelligence war fighting function to cement victory. This overreliance on an ineffective logistical support chain, combined with poor strategy, toxic leadership, and indecisiveness, resulted in an overly defensive positon. This ineptitude set the stage for the loss of British populace support, costing him the war of attrition.
Even after Moltke issued a change to the plan to Kluck and General von Bülow, commander of the Second Army on Kluck’s left, Kluck willfully ignored the directive and began to cross the Marne River with Paris in sight. Clausewitz notes, “A battalion is made up of individuals, the least important of whom may chance to delay things or somehow make them go wrong.” If a man of minor importance can have a strategic effect, then a field general’s impact may be catastrophic. Indeed, Kluck’s decision proved costly for the First and Second German Armies since the French not only took advantage of the gap between the armies but also launched a surprise counter-offensive that would prompt the Second Army to retrograde. As the beleaguered French and British armies attempted to pursue the Germans, the efforts on both sides to out-maneuver the other would result in the stalemate of entrenched warfare on the Western
I seek to explain the onset of World War I, World War II Europe, and World War II Pacific by using a systemic level of analysis, particularly dynamic differentials theory. Dynamic Differentials Theory states that war is likely when a dominant power is facing deep and inevitable decline. These dominant powers are more likely to wage war against another power because they suspect their own power is fleeting and want to prevent their decline by any means necessary. This theory also states that war is only likely in a multipolar system when the declining state has substantially more military power than the others, and will only declare war when the declining power believes its military strength has reached its peak. WORLD WAR
Germany’s broken policies and the decoded Zimmerman note were the major causes of Woodrow Wilson’s declaration of war. When the beginning of World War I came around, it was a very difficult time for everyone. President Wilson pledged a state of neutrality on behalf of the United States and had a vast majority of Americans backing him up in the meantime. However, it wasn’t long until tension started to rise up in America
This was due to the fact that there was not enough ships or troops at the time to do that. Churchill believed that only by securing the island of Madagascar by the use of a strong navy and air force, was the only way. After commandos left, the protection of garrisons were to be taken over by troops from the KAR and the East African Forces. Everything was believed to go as planned, but circumstances soon changed everything. It was in March of 1942, that the Japanese soon began raids against the British navy.
The stage leading up to the outbreak of World War 1 featured incredibly impactful decisions that would eventually create the beginning of the Modern Era. However, diplomacy leading up to World War 1 created a negative impact on the war in that it was largely based upon a balance of power. Globally, this outdated diplomacy lead to the militarism of all countries involved, thus only heightening the tensions, and leading up to the outbreak of World War 1. By the end of the war, it is evident that many of the countries recognized their mistakes and attempted to find long-term solutions through extensive treaties and international humanitarian efforts. The diplomatic tendencies of many prominent leaders invited war.
In 1914, the First World War commenced. The outbreak of war was a result of a number of factors, however, many historians argue that German policies were the main feature for the start of the war. Therefore, this essay will address the question: to what extent did German policies lead to WWI? Firstly, it is extremely unjust to state Germany as the only country to blame for the war and make it pay the harsh punishments the Treaty of Versailles forced them to.
This invasion nevertheless angered the British who sent Germany an ultimatum, demanding it to withdraw from Belgium. The ultimatum was nevertheless rejected by the Germany and therefore, Britain declared war on Germany. (“The History Place”) It seems to be a perfect example of democratic fraternity exists since when Belgium, a democratic state, is in danger, other democratic states such as the UK stand out and help out. However, I would like to argue that Britain’s involvement is not because of the kindness to help out Belgium but because of their concerns with the threats of the Germany.
Q7. General Alfred Graf von Schlieffen was first faced with a very complex task. He would have to come up with a plan that would allow the Germans to fight and win a two front war, as you can imagine achieving this goal would prove to be a difficult challenge. The odds would most likely be stacked against him as he went to work in achieving his country 's task. Eventually, after a long period of time, the Schlieffen Plan was created.
Furthermore, ‘a supreme emergency exists when our deepest values and our collective survival are in imminent danger (SCHWENKENBECHER 2009).Walzer holds that Great Britain was facing such a supreme emergency during a certain period of World War II when it was under attack from Nazi Germany, which constituted an ‘evil objectified in the world’’ (SCHWENKENBECHER 2009). Walzer holds that, at least in the first years of the war while Germany was undefeated, the situation was a supreme emergency because a German victory would have constituted an ultimate threat to Britain. However, Walzer claims that after it became clear that Germany could no longer win the war, there no longer was a supreme emergency (SCHWENKENBECHER 2009).In a supreme emergency situation, it is morally permissible to directly and intentionally target and kill innocents, or non-combatants’ (SCHWENKENBECHER 2009). In Walzer’s example, it was justified to bomb residential areas of German cities, thus directly targeting the civilian population’ (SCHWENKENBECHER 2009).
This is also a result of his overconfidence, instead of blaming himself for going to the Mediterranean, he blamed his allies and got blamed by the generals under him. This internal destruction would lead Hitler’s failure to take over the Soviet
Also depleting air strength meant the remaining warplanes had to be hoarded to defend Japanese Home Islands. With no available means to defend Iwo Jima, Japan decided to rely on the established defensive equipment in the area and check U.S. by delaying tactics to gain time for defense of the mainland. Japanese Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi was assigned the task of defending Iwo Jima. Knowing he couldn’t win the battle, he aimed at inflicting heavy casualties on American forces to force them to reconsider invasion of Mainland Japan. His strategy was radically different from Japan’s usual strategy of beach defense to face the landings directly.
Through the first great war two of the allies, Britain and France while allies in the war held onto their stark rivalry. Britain’s front on the war quickly developed into a stalemate due to Germany’s well developed technology and the Ottoman empire 's vast size and availability to resources. Due to the incorrect prediction that the war would end by 1914 Britain 's prime minister, Asquith decided that expanding the war and thus straining the central powers resources and men would be the correct course of action to end the world war. This secret plan to “strike the underbelly”(Turkey) of the Central Powers began by a dealing between Britain, France and Russia to unite in order to undermine the Ottoman empire.
One of the main reasons for the Axis losing the war, or the Allie’s winning it, was war production. The disparity between Germany’s, Japan’s, the Soviet Union’s, Great Britain 's and the United State’s resources played a consequential role in the turning point of the war in 1942. It was more than just the natural resources that caused this great divide; it was also the man- or shall we say woman- power that each country had backing them. Countries such as Germany barred women from entering a non-domestic workforce until they were so low on manpower and production that it was too late. While places such as the UK used women to the fullest extent in the task and labor force and even allowed them into low risk military jobs.