Nike State Power Essay

State Power

Before the 1990s, governments held the power of authority and, in collaboration with unions and international private organizations, could enforce human rights regulations in manufacturing. Rapid growth brought by globalization, however, “has led to an institutional mismatch” (Wettstein and Waddock, 2005, p.305) between MNCs and the State, resulting in MNCs possessing increased power, thus representing the decline of the regulating state hypothesis. As MNCs expanded and dispersed their authority, governments lost their “ability to enforce regulations upon private sectors”, leading to “a weakening or transformation of the State” (Crouch, 2011). As a result, debates have arisen over the extent to which States still possess authority

The ambiguity established through the M-Audit and CR are amongst the key problems encountered with Nike’s voluntary auditing system, which make it inefficient at measuring positive changes in working conditions in the long-run. For sustained improvements to be implemented in Nike’s global supply chain factories, an institutionalized downstream pressure must be implemented. NGOs’ creation of guidelines is important to guarantee uniformed labour standards across countries and states. However, without combined pressure from the State, the guidelines remain as advices. Henceforth, NGOs and States must collaborate in exerting increased pressure to Nike. In turn, Nike exerts pressure on its manufacturing companies by threatening the end of contracts, resulting in the companies having no choice but to improve their working conditions, through lean manufacturing techniques, for instance. Hence, voluntary and mandatory approaches should coexist. Without the external forces, Nike and its suppliers may do the bear minimum to sustain long-term improvement in working